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Key points 
After the illegal annexation of Crimea and Russia’s indirect responsibility for the downing of 
Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in eastern Ukraine, what will it take before the EU can effectively 
confront a conflict on its borders and prove to both its own citizens and third countries that it has a 
meaningful role to play in foreign policy? With numerous competing national interests and some 
member states unwilling to pay different prices for collective action, any sector-wide EU sanctions 
are likely to lack serious bite. In an effort to paper over the cracks, the following recommendations 
should be taken into account. 
Recommendations 
 The High Representative, supported by the EEAS, should use the policy space between the 
institutions and the member states by initiating collective action and ensuring that the EU’s 
ample toolbox is better used by institutions and member states alike. Such efforts should start 
with activating the EEAS’ Crisis Platform to coordinate EU and national capabilities.  
 Member states should show more solidarity with their fellow Council members and reach out 
more pro-actively to the EEAS as a hub to coordinate joint action. 
 The Council should decide by QMV to define collective action on the basis of a European 
Council decision (or a proposal by the High Representative following a request from the 
European Council) regarding the EU’s strategic interests and objectives vis-à-vis Russia and 
Ukraine. 
 When national interests are considered to be important but not vital, the constructive 
abstention mechanism should be invoked by those member states that, for diplomatic reasons, 
object to the partial or full interruption or reduction of economic and financial relations with 
Russia, but that at the same time do not wish to derail consensus in the Council on the 
adoption a CFSP decision. This decision should form the legal basis for the subsequent 
adoption of implementing acts by the Council, deciding by QMV on the necessary restrictive 
measures. 
 As chair of the Foreign Affairs Council, the High Representative should remind individual 
member states of their duty of loyal cooperation under the CFSP and nudge them towards 
constructive abstention from decision-making. This would allow solidarity among member 
states and collective action by the EU to prevail over internal divisions. 
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he downing of Malaysia Airlines flight 
MH17 over eastern Ukraine has 
unleashed a storm of grief and anger in 
the EU and around the world. Heads of state 
and government have joined the public 
outcry and called for tough action against 
those directly and indirectly responsible for 
this heinous crime. The EU’s reaction, 
however, has been lame so far by 
comparison. 
The joint statement of the presidents of the 
European Council and the Commission; the 
few statements by High Representative 
Ashton; the minute’s silence to pay tribute to 
the victims and the passionate speeches by 
ministers at the opening of the Foreign 
Affairs Council of July 22nd cannot mask the 
disappointingly low level of consensus 
among member states on how to punish 
those responsible.  
The conclusions of that Council meeting 
amount to a convoluted way of saying: For 
now there will be no new sanctions other 
than those restrictive measures already 
agreed to. Instead, the process of black-listing 
“individuals or entities who actively provide 
material or financial support to or are 
benefiting from the Russian decision-makers 
responsible for the annexation of Crimea or 
the destabilisation of Eastern-Ukraine” has 
been accelerated – in line with a decision 
already taken on July 16th. 
This is too little, too late. After Crimea and 
MH17, how many red lines have to be 
crossed before the EU is able to overcome its 
cowardice and effectively counter such 
disdain for international law and the lives of 
innocent civilians in a conflict on its borders? 
Admittedly, the Council did issue a threat to 
impose so-called ‘Level-3’ economic sanctions 
against Russia, “covering access to capital 
markets, defence, dual use goods and 
sensitive technologies, including in the 
energy sector”. The adoption of such 
sanctions is conditional on Russia blocking 
independent inquiries into the downing of 
the Malaysian plane and failing to prevent 
arms supplies cross its border with Ukraine. 
After a brief lull in the fighting around the 
site of the crash, renewed hostilities have 
hindered the work of independent forensic 
teams to recover the remaining bodies of 
passengers. Moreover, the Kremlin has opted 
for a further escalation of the conflict by 
amassing more troops on the border with 
Ukraine and increasing its direct involvement 
in fighting between the Ukrainian military 
and separatist insurgents. This should trigger 
robust retaliation from the European Union 
in the form of full-blown ‘Level-3’ sanctions. 
The credibility of the EU as a foreign policy 
actor is at stake here.  
Unfortunately, in all probability the EU will 
again manage no more than to keep up 
appearances. Consensus in the Council 
remains elusive as long as one or two 
member states break rank to protect their 
national economic and/or political interests, 
e.g. energy for Germany, Italy and a host of 
Central and Eastern EU member states; the 
sale of two warships for France; financial 
interests for the UK; and cross-border 
economic cooperation for Finland. With 
numerous competing national interests and 
some member states unwilling to incur 
different costs for collective action, it is 
expected that officials will struggle to find a 
balance and that concessions agreed to will 
prevent any sector-wide sanctions from 
having serious bite. The EU therefore risks 
not satisfying popular demand to effectively 
punish those indirectly responsible for 
MH17. Conversely, the Kremlin’s contempt 
for the EU may only grow if its own minimal 
efforts at window-dressing (e.g. paying lip-
service to a peace plan for eastern Ukraine) 
allow it to escape the full force of sanctions.  
So far, the highest profile failure on the part 
of member states to reach a common position 
on a foreign and security policy issue arose 
out of the 2002-03 Transatlantic crisis over 
military intervention in Iraq. Back then, the 
internal disunity led to extensive soul-
searching. In an effort to paper over the 
cracks, the European Security Strategy was 
adopted and the High Representative’s post 
was beefed up, complete with the creation of 
a European External Action Service (EEAS). 
However, more often than not, the EU still 
fails to coordinate a common policy response 
(proportionate) to external crises, even when 
the structures and the instruments to address 
them (technical support, a civilian crisis 
T 
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response capability, sanctions, Battlegroups 
and EEAS public diplomacy) are at hand.  
The need for more flexibility in CFSP 
In order to overcome the inability of the EU 
to punch its weight as an international actor, 
the EU should start by reviewing its strategic 
interests and challenges. The next High 
Representative should update and upgrade 
the 2003 European Security Strategy. The 
world and the EU’s neighbourhood have 
changed. So has the position of the Union 
itself in the world. Moreover, the EU’s 
projection of power is certainly not defined in 
security terms only. The implementation of 
the EU’s external action has taken on a much 
more comprehensive approach; joining up 
the different strands of its external relations 
policies (security, humanitarian relief, 
development cooperation, trade, sanctions, 
etc.). The European Council should endorse 
the next High Representative’s proposal for a 
new ‘EU Global Strategy’ (see, e.g., 
http://www.euglobalstrategy.eu/) and re-
evaluate it on a yearly basis. 
But strategising alone will not save EU 
foreign policy. The next High Representative, 
supported by the EEAS, should optimise the 
policy space between the institutions and the 
member states by initiating collective action 
and making sure that the EU’s ample toolbox 
is better used by institutions and member 
states alike. Such efforts should start by 
activating the ‘Crisis Platform’ within the 
EEAS to coordinate EU and national 
capabilities in response to crises of all types 
(something that did not happen in the wake 
of the crash of flight MH17). Member states, 
for their part, should show more solidarity 
with their fellow Council members and reach 
out more pro-actively to the EEAS as a hub to 
coordinate joint action. 
The crux of the matter remains that the 
success of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) ultimately hinges on the ability 
of the member states to find consensus on 
issues that touch upon the core of their 
sovereignty as independent actors on the 
international stage. Whereas this process of 
coordination, which is ‘lubricated’ by the 
High Representative and the EEAS, often 
results in a race to the bottom for the lowest 
common denominator - a certain flexibility 
has been introduced into the CFSP over time 
to keep the member states “united in 
diversity” (as the old motto of the EU goes):  
 the constructive abstention mechanism;  
 the introduction of qualified majority 
voting (QMV); and  
 the extension of enhanced cooperation to 
CFSP by the Lisbon Treaty.  
In its decision-making process on sector-wide 
sanctions against Russia, two of the above-
mentioned modalities could be applied. First, 
the Council could in principle decide by 
QMV to define a collective action on the basis 
of a European Council decision (or on a 
proposal that the High Representative has 
presented following a specific request from 
the European Council) relating to the Union’s 
strategic interests and objectives vis-à-vis 
Russia and the stability of Ukraine. The basic 
decision could be adopted as early as in the 
last week of July, when the European Council 
is set to convene for an extraordinary 
summit. To be sure, this procedure does not 
undermine the centrality of consensus for the 
adoption of CFSP decisions because it 
represents a clearly stated ‘derogation’ from 
the general unanimity requirement. Any 
member state is therefore entitled to pull the 
‘emergency brake’ and block a CFSP proposal 
for “vital and stated reasons of national 
policy”. This is a situation in which the 
second modality could be used. 
When national interests are considered to be 
important but not “vital”, the constructive 
abstention mechanism might provide a safety 
valve for EU foreign policy. The mechanism 
should be invoked by those member states 
that for diplomatic reasons object to the 
interruption or reduction, in part or 
completely, of economic and financial 
relations with Russia, but that at the same 
time do not wish to derail consensus in the 
Council on the adoption a CFSP decision. 
This decision should form the legal basis for 
the subsequent adoption of implementing 
acts by the Council, deciding by QMV on the 
necessary restrictive measures. The initiative 
for invoking the constructive abstention 
mechanism lies in principle with the 
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respective member states (representing no 
more than one-third of the member states 
comprising one third of the EU’s population). 
However, as permanent chair of the Foreign 
Affairs Council, the High Representative 
should remind individual member states of 
their duty of loyal cooperation under the 
CFSP and nudge them towards constructive 
abstention from decision-making so as to 
allow solidarity among member states and 
collective action by the EU to prevail over 
internal divisions. 
The above-mentioned modalities provide the 
thin edge of the wedge that infuses more 
flexibility into CFSP decision-making.1 Their 
operational scope should be expanded by the 
European Council, tasking the High 
Representative to propose decisions to be 
adopted by the Council by QMV. Taken 
together, these modalities should enable the 
EU to increase its visibility, efficiency, 
effectiveness and credibility as an 
international actor.  
Constructive abstention 
In a mechanism that is unique under the 
Treaties, Article 31(1) leaves room for a 
member state to abstain from Council 
decision-making in the field of CFSP. The 
second subparagraph clarifies that, “[w]hen 
abstaining in a vote, any member of the 
Council may qualify its abstention by making 
a formal declaration”. The latter is not an 
obligation but rather offers each member 
state with a discretionary power to offer an 
explanation for its position. The provision 
further states that, in the case of an 
abstention, the member in question  
shall not be obliged to apply the decision, 
but shall accept that the decision commits 
the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, 
[that] Member State shall refrain from 
any action likely to conflict with or 
                                                     
1  For more analysis and recommendations on the 
three above-mentioned modalities and the use of 
core groups, see the pages below, drawn from 
“Differentiation in CFSP”, in S. Blockmans (ed.), 
Differentiated Integration in the EU: From the Inside 
Looking Out (CEPS, 2014), 46-56, 
(http://www.ceps.eu/book/differentiated-
integration-eu-%E2%80%93-inside-looking-out). 
impede Union action based on that 
decision, and the other Member States 
shall respect its position.  
Although not giving support to the adopted 
decision, the abstaining member state can 
therefore not be relieved of the general duty 
of loyal cooperation in CFSP matters: it “shall 
refrain from any action which is contrary to 
the interests of the Union or likely to impair 
its effectiveness as a cohesive force in 
international relations” (Article 24(3) TEU). 
The rules of CFSP decision-making leave no 
doubt about the prevalence of external 
solidarity over internal divisions. The Treaty 
does not permit that the member state 
abstaining from the implementation of a 
properly adopted CFSP decision disregard its 
binding consequences. All EU member states, 
whether giving or withholding their support, 
need to respect the resulting commitments 
for the EU as a whole and must therefore 
refrain from any action that goes against that 
decision.2 
In general terms, the mechanism of 
constructive abstention aims to reconcile the 
position held by the majority of member 
states with the reservations and concerns of 
some. It has been observed that while the 
possibility of keeping a ‘constructive 
distance’ from certain decisions − as, indeed, 
the possibility of their obstruction − facilitates 
the formation of common positions on CFSP 
matters, it also drains the CFSP’s potential 
impact when the adopted decisions require 
active implementation by as many member 
states as possible. 3  In fact, Article 31(1), 
second subparagraph TEU, determines that if 
such constructive abstentions “represent at 
least one third of the Member States 
comprising at least one third of the 
population of the Union, [then] the decision 
shall not be adopted.” Under the pre-Lisbon 
Treaty regime, Council members 
representing one-third of the weighted vote 
                                                     
2 Second subparagraph of Article 31(1) TEU. 
3  See C. Törö, “The Latest Example of Enhanced 
Cooperation in the Constitutional Treaty: The 
benefits of flexibility and differentiation in European 
Security and Defence Policy decisions and their 
implementation”, 11 European Law Journal (2005), 
641-656. 
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used for calculating QMV could block a CFSP 
decision (cf. Article 23(1), second 
subparagraph former TEU). Now, a double 
threshold is required for a blocking minority: 
one-third of the member states, representing 
at least one-third of the EU population. The 
Lisbon Treaty has thus widened the legal 
scope to accommodate member states’ 
interests in abstaining from CFSP decision-
making by unanimity. 
It appears that this instrument for flexibility 
in CFSP decision-making still has to gain 
popularity. So far, the mechanism has only 
been used once, in February 2008, when 
Cyprus abstained when the Council adopted 
the Decision establishing the EULEX Kosovo 
mission. 4  Cyprus argued “for an explicit 
decision of the UN Security Council [to 
mandate] the EU mission in Kosovo”5  - an 
entity it does not recognise as a sovereign 
and independent state. This important case 
shows that the constructive- abstention 
mechanism provides a form of flexibility that 
can prevent the type of decision-making 
impasse in the CFSP that QMV and enhanced 
cooperation are designed to avoid.6 The High 
Representative and the EEAS should promote 
the practical relevance of the mechanism 
more actively. 
Qualified Majority Voting  
Since its inception, intergovernmentalism has 
been the governance mode par excellence in 
CFSP. Yet, limited but significant exceptions 
to the unanimity rule have slowly ‘spilled 
over’ from adjacent fields of EU external 
                                                     
4 Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 
2008 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in 
Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO, OJ 2008 L 42/92. 
5 See Council Secretariat, Council doc. CM 448/08 of 
4 February 2008, point 2, on file with author. 
6 See M. Cremona, “Enhanced Cooperation and the 
European Foreign and Security and Defence Policy”, 
in J.M. Beneyto (ed.), Unity and Flexibility in the 
Future of the European Union: the Challenge of Enhanced 
Cooperation (Madrid, CEU Ediciones 2009), 75, at 87, 
who also points to Jaeger’s argument that enhanced 
cooperation is “less negative” than constructive 
abstention. See T. Jaeger, “Enhanced Cooperation in 
the Treaty of Nice and Flexibility in the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy”, 7 EFAR (2002), 297, at 
302. 
action into CFSP. The Treaty of Nice 7 
introduced three types of decisions that the 
Council adopts by QMV, pursuant to the 
current Article 31(2) TEU: i) when adopting a 
decision defining a Union action or position 
on the basis of a European Council decision 
relating to the Union’s strategic interests and 
objectives (cf. Article 22(1) TEU); ii) when 
adopting any decision implementing a 
decision defining a Union action or position; 
and iii) when appointing an EU Special 
Representative in accordance with Article 33 
TEU.8 To be sure, these QMV constellations 
did not and do not undermine the continued 
centrality of unanimity for the adoption of 
CFSP decisions, because they represent 
clearly stated ‘derogation[s]’ from the general 
unanimity requirement laid down in Article 
31(1) TEU. 9  In each of these cases, any 
member state is entitled to pull the 
‘emergency brake’ and block a CFSP proposal 
“for vital and stated reasons of national 
policy” (see below). The Treaty of Lisbon has 
inserted a fourth instance of QMV in CFSP 
decision-making by the Council, i.e. when 
adopting any decision defining a Union 
action or position, on a proposal that the 
High Representative has presented 
“following a specific request from the 
European Council, made on its own initiative 
or that of the High Representative”.  
The opportunity of opening up more avenues 
for QMV was also enshrined in a new 
passerelle clause: Article 31(3) TEU enables the 
European Council to extend the cases of 
QMV by unanimously adopting a decision 
stipulating that the Council shall act by 
qualified majority in other cases, with the 
exception of decisions having military or 
defence implications (Article 31(4) TEU). This 
new and generous licence for extending the 
QMV mechanism enables the European 
Council to adjust the CFSP decision-making 
order in response to future needs and 
considerations of member states. However, 
                                                     
7 See Article 23(2) former TEU. 
8 See P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2012), at 488-9. 
9 As before the Lisbon Treaty, procedural decisions 
are to be taken by a simple majority. See Article 31(5) 
TEU. 
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the condition of full concurrence of national 
positions among the heads of state and 
government guarantees that the doors to the 
passage from unanimity to QMV will be 
firmly guarded and remain shut when 
contrary to the vital national interests or 
opposition of any member state.10 Moreover, 
in some member states (e.g. the UK and 
Germany), the government will not be able to 
agree to use this passerelle without prior 
approval by its parliament.11 
As already noted, there are two exceptions to 
the use of QMV in CFSP matters. First, it does 
not extend to decisions having military or 
defence implications (Article 31(4) TEU). 
Secondly, every member state has a veto 
right and can pull the so-called ‘emergency 
brake’ (Article 31(2) TEU): 
If a member of the Council declares that, 
for vital and stated reasons of national 
policy, it intends to oppose the adoption 
of a decision to be taken by qualified 
majority, a vote shall not be taken. The 
High Representative will, in close 
consultation with the Member State 
involved, search for a solution acceptable 
to it. If he does not succeed, the Council 
may, acting by a qualified majority, 
request that the matter be referred to the 
European Council for a decision by 
unanimity. 
On the basis of the foregoing, one may 
conclude that the general rule of unanimity 
makes it difficult for the EU to forge common 
foreign and security policies on matters of 
both general and specific interest. Especially 
on questions about the use of force or 
interference in the internal matters of third 
states, a ‘common’ foreign and security policy 
is unlikely to emerge from the divisions that 
separate member states. It is unlikely that EU 
member states are ready to give up their veto 
power in return for more extended use of 
QMV in highly sensitive areas of 
                                                     
10  Contribution by Csaba Törö to the EPIN 
Conference devoted to “The External Dimension of 
EU Variable Geometry”, held in Brussels on 6 May 
2013. 
11  See J.-C. Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and 
Political Analysis (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press 2010), at 262. 
international relations. QMV in CFSP will 
realistically work only in situations in which 
either none of the member states has 
particularly strong preferences or when there 
are no major divisions within the Council. In 
these cases it is reasonable to assume that the 
Heads of State and Government could reach 
the consensus needed to request a proposal 
from the High Representative and that no 
member state would consider its interests 
vital enough to justify slamming the 
emergency brake. For the sake of a more 
efficient and effective CFSP, the High 
Representative and the EEAS should 
nevertheless be tasked by the European 
Council to draw up a list of strategic interests 
and objectives of the EU external action that 
should be decided by QMV in the Council.  
Extension of enhanced cooperation to 
CFSP  
Enhanced cooperation, which was designed 
in the pre-Amsterdam IGC to allow some 
member states, using the EU framework and 
institutions, to cooperate further among 
themselves in cases where the others do not 
wish to do so, has been extended by the 
Lisbon Treaty to cover the entire realm of 
CFSP (Article 331(2) TFEU), including 
defence. 12  The Lisbon Treaty also removed 
the ‘emergency brake’ procedure, albeit not 
completely. Furthermore, the Treaty 
provided for a new passerelle which allows 
participants in an enhanced cooperation to 
decide in the Council to switch from 
unanimity to QMV and from a special 
legislative procedure to the ordinary 
legislative procedure (Article 333(2) TFEU), 
except in defence matters (Article 333(1) 
TFEU). 
Nevertheless, these innovations might not 
provide the flexibility that several member 
states had hoped for. After all, enhanced 
cooperation in CSFP is characterised by its 
narrow scope, cumbersome procedures and 
strict establishment requirements. As Piris 
has pointed out,  
                                                     
12 Pre-Lisbon, it only covered the implementation of 
a CFSP action, which had already been decided 
upon. Compare Articles 27A to 27E former TEU. 
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the effect of these slight improvements 
will be somewhat reduced by the increase 
in the minimum number of participants 
from eight to nine member states […]; the 
requirement of unanimity in the Council 
for authorising any kind of enhanced 
cooperation in CFSP, without any 
exception for an enhanced co-operation 
that would aim at implementing CFSP 
decisions which have already been 
adopted (whereas until the Lisbon Treaty 
there had been QMV in such a case); 
[and] the requirement of the consent of 
the European Parliament (where MEPs 
from all member states have a right to 
vote) for launching an enhanced co-
operation, even for cases where the co-
decision procedure does not apply 
(whereas, until the Lisbon Treaty, in cases 
where co-decision did not apply the 
European Parliament was only to be 
consulted) […].13 
Moreover, some of the pre-conditions for the 
launch of an enhanced cooperation in CFSP 
continue to apply: it is a ‘last resort’ 
mechanism (Article 20(2) TEU) and there is 
no undermining the internal market (Article 
326 TFEU). Taken together, these factors 
explain why the mechanism has not been 
used in practice in the area of CFSP. Instead, 
member states, in particular the smaller ones, 
have sought refuge in alternative forms of 
closer cooperation, created in a more flexible 
and informal way outside the framework of 
the treaties, i.e. without the burdensome 
decision-making procedures and without the 
exacting requirements for ‘enhanced 
cooperation’, helped by the fact that the CFSP 
− and thus the determination where the 
limits of the powers shared with the EU 
precisely lie − falls outside of the jurisdiction 
of the Court of Justice. 
Coalitions of member states 
Close foreign policy cooperation among a 
limited number of EU member states is 
generally looked upon with suspicion as it is 
associated with directoires of large member 
states (e.g. the UK, France and Germany in 
the context of the E3+3 negotiations with 
                                                     
13 Piris, op. cit., at 89-90. 
Iran). 14  However, under certain conditions, 
the specialisation and division of labour 
among EU member states, big and small, can 
strengthen the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
EU foreign policy, especially in cases where 
there is a lack of interest or political will 
among all member states.15 Indeed, as long as 
such more or less structured coalitions of 
member states work towards the attainment 
of the Union’s external action objectives (cf. 
Article 21 TEU) and policies, the extra efforts, 
money and other national resources devoted 
by ‘core groups’ to specific foreign policy 
matters (regional or thematic) can help to i) 
alleviate the stress on an understaffed and 
cash-strapped European External Action 
Service (EEAS), 16  ii) assist in the 
operationalisation of EU foreign policy, and 
iii) increase the visibility and credibility of 
the EU as an international actor.  
In practice, several types of coalitions of 
member states have been formed:  
 permanent (e.g. Benelux17) and ad hoc (e.g. 
the UK and France pushing the EU on 
lifting the ban on arming opposition 
forces in Syria18); 
                                                     
14 See, e.g., C. Gégout, “The Quint: Acknowledging 
the existence of a big four-US directoire at the heart 
of the European Union’s foreign policy decision-
making process”, 40 JCMS (2002), 331-344. See 
further, S. Lehne, “The Big Three in EU Foreign 
Policy”, Carnegie Paper, July 2012; and S. Blockmans, 
“Beyond Entrenchment over Iran: Can the EU offer a 
framework for regional security?”, CEPS 
Commentary, 3 September 2012. 
15 S. Keukeleire, “EU Core Groups – Specialisation 
and division of labour in EU foreign policy”, CEPS 
Working Document No. 252, October 2006. 
16  See S. Blockmans, “EEAS Reloaded: 
Recommendations for the 2013 Review”, CEPS 
Commentary, 12 December 2012. 
17 Article 3(2) sub d and Articles 24-27 of the 2008 
Benelux Treaty attribute an external relations 
competence to the institutions of the Benelux. See 
also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 
Press release, “Verhagen: new impetus for Benelux 
foreign policy”, 9 April 2008; and A. Rettman, 
“Benelux countries urge EU unity on Syria”, EU 
Observer, 15 March 2013. 
18  See C. McDonald-Gibson, “Syria arms embargo 
lifted: Britain and France force EU to relax ban on 
supplying weapons to rebels”, The Independent, 28 
May 2013. 
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 institutionalised (e.g. Visegrad Group) 19 
and loosely organised (e.g. the EU Core 
Group on Somalia, created early 2004, 
consisted primarily of the UK, Italy, 
Sweden and the European Commission, 
and was endorsed by the Council);20 
 regional (e.g. Baltic Council of 
Ministers), 21 , inter-regional (e.g. the 
partnership framework of the Baltic and 
Benelux countries 22  and that of Nordic, 
Baltic and Visegrad countries), 23  and 
thematic (e.g. mediation or reconciliation 
efforts).24 
From this overview it becomes clear that 
these types of coalitions of member states 
have the potential to reinforce the CFSP. The 
challenge, however, is to make sure that these 
groupings do not obstruct but rather buttress 
the structures (in particular the HR, EU 
Special Representatives and the EEAS), 
procedures, policies and actions of the EU in 
the foreign and security field by: 
 pooling more intensively the coalition 
members’ views, efforts, measures and 
policies to support a more coherent and 
effective CFSP; 
                                                     
19  See (http://www.visegradgroup.eu), the 
collaborative framework consisting of Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary intent joining up 
on, inter alia, foreign policy towards the Western 
Balkans. See Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 
Visegrad Group (V4) and Western Balkans, “Joint 
Statement of the Visegrad Group on the Western 
Balkans”, Warsaw, 25 October 2012. 
20  See GAERC, “Somalia – Council conclusions”, 
Press release 7033/06 (Presse 68), Brussels, 20 March 
2006. 
21  See (http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/4595/ 
cooperation-among-the-baltic-states/), also for a link 
to the “‘Terms of Reference” of the Baltic Council. 
22 See P. Vaida, “Baltic and Benelux formins discuss 
EU foreign policy in Estonia”, The Baltic Course, 
Vilnius, 12 September 2011. 
23  See Co-Chair’s Statement, “Meeting of Foreign 
Ministers of the Visegrad, Nordic and Baltic states”, 
Gdańsk, 20 February, 2013, 
(http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/official
-statements/meeting-of-foreign). 
24  E.g. the Swedish-Finnish initiative to set up a 
European Institute of Peace. See J. Claes, ‘Toward a 
European Institute of Peace’, Peacebrief No. 141, 21 
February 2013. 
 adopting new measures to further the 
external action objectives of the EU, 
particularly through measures by 
member states in policy domains where 
the EU as such has few or no competences 
or capabilities, but where some 
coordination with the EU is useful or 
essential; 
 preparing the ground for new EU 
initiatives and decisions in CFSP; 
 concretising, implementing and assuring 
the follow-up of CFSP decisions; 
 initiating, broadening or deepening the 
dialogue, mediation or negotiation with 
third parties (in particular those not 
recognised by the EU, e.g. de facto states, 
terrorist groups), allowing less formal 
and more frequent, flexible and 
purposive interaction, in addition to the 
efforts conducted by the EU; 
 strengthening the coordination with 
external actors (e.g. third states, other 
regional organisations, UN agencies, 
NGOs), in a systematic way compatible 
with that by the EEAS; and 
 implementing any other tasks that the 
Council or the High Representative may 
assign to a particular coalition of EU 
Member states.25 
In short, the existence of core groups of EU 
member states should not be seen as a 
problem for the development of a CFSP per 
se. As shown above, it could rather be part of 
the solution in overcoming the constraints in 
CFSP decision-making. There are, however, 
two other ‘constitutional’ obligations that 
should guide such core groups’ activities: i) 
the fact that member states are under a legal 
obligation to loyally cooperate with the EU 
institutions (European Council, Council and 
Commission, supported by the EEAS acting 
under the authority of the High 
Representative); and, in the slipstream of this: 
ii) the duty to ensure the (vertical) 
consistency of EU external action (arguably 
the latter requires consultation and 
coordination with HR + EEAS). Respect for 
                                                     
25 This list of tasks and functions is inspired on the 
longer one developed by Keukeleire, op cit. 
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these principles should prevent EU external 
policies and actions from being diluted, 
undermined, rendered less visible, and re-
nationalised by core groups’ activities. 
